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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Steven Vogt appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. A 
Pennsylvania inmate, Vogt alleged his constitutional rights to 
due process and access to the courts were violated when prison 
officials rejected his incoming mail without notifying him of 
the rejection. We agree with Vogt that the Court’s evaluation 
of his due process claim was erroneous. In doing so, we join 
several of our sister courts and hold that, under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 
(1974), prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail 
is rejected. Thus, we will vacate and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
I 
Three decades ago, Vogt and Arthur McClearn were 
part of a group who took Francis Landry to a quarry. There, the 
group forced Landry off a cliff into the water before rolling a 
“huge rock” in behind him. App. 79. Landry suffered blunt 
force trauma and drowned. Vogt and McClearn were arrested 
shortly afterward. McClearn pleaded guilty to third-degree 
murder. Vogt went to trial, where McClearn’s testimony linked 
him to Landry’s death. The jury convicted Vogt of several 
crimes, including first-degree murder. As a result, he was 
sentenced to life without parole.  
Not long before McClearn died, he sent a letter to Vogt 
dated October 23, 2016, in which he recanted his trial 
testimony. See App. 28. Explaining he was “ready to tell the 
truth,” McClearn said his testimony was a lie. Id. McClearn 
wrote that he had a different partner in crime that night; Vogt 




So according to the letter—and contrary to McClearn’s 
testimony at trial—Vogt did not have “anything to do with” 
Landry’s murder. Id.  
McClearn’s letter never made it to Vogt that fall. The 
prison’s policy is to reject mail lacking a return address, so it 
rejected the letter. Some six months later, Vogt contacted a 
United States Postal Service reclamation center looking for a 
different mailing. The Post Office returned several items, one 
of which was McClearn’s letter. But by that time, McClearn 
had been dead for about five months.  
After he obtained the letter in the spring, Vogt filed a 
grievance about the rejection. But the prison denied it as 
untimely because he filed it well after the previous fall’s 
rejection. After his appeal of that decision failed, Vogt 
petitioned under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 (PCRA). There, he challenged his 
guilty verdict and argued the letter supported his actual 
innocence. The state court dismissed his petition as untimely.  
Vogt then filed his five-page pro se complaint against 
Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel and an unknown prison 
mailroom employee. He claimed the rejection without notice 
violated his right to procedural due process. And he claimed 
his First Amendment right to access the courts was violated 
because the rejected mail contained McClearn’s recantation. 
On those bases, he sought compensatory and punitive damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Wetzel moved to dismiss. He argued security interests 
justified the prison’s mail policy. Vogt responded in a 
fourteen-page brief that cited Procunier and contended 




6. At its core, Vogt’s allegation was “not that [the letter] was 
refused, but that it was refused without requ[is]ite notice.” Id. 
While the motion to dismiss was pending before the 
District Court, the state court vacated and remanded the order 
dismissing Vogt’s PCRA petition. Three months later, the 
Magistrate Judge recommended the District Court dismiss 
Vogt’s due process claims with prejudice. She also 
recommended dismissing his access claim without prejudice 
because it was not ripe for review. Despite Vogt’s reliance on 
Procunier, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation (R&R) did not discuss the case. Still without 
counsel, Vogt objected to the R&R, reiterating his reliance on 
Procunier. The District Court adopted the R&R without 
addressing his objections. Vogt filed this timely appeal.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
review is plenary. Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 262–
63 (3d Cir. 2017). 
We construe Vogt’s pro se filings liberally. Mala v. 
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013). 
This means we remain flexible, especially “when dealing with 
imprisoned pro se litigants” like Vogt. Id. at 244. And we 
“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has 
failed to name it.” Id. Yet “pro se litigants still must allege 
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. at 
245. And “they cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide 





We begin with Vogt’s first contention, that the District 
Court erred in dismissing his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process claim.  
A 
Vogt acknowledges that the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections’ policy is to reject incoming mail lacking a 
return address. DC-ADM 803 § 1.A.4(b), at 1-3 (effective 
October 29, 2015), ECF No. 116; Vogt Br. 9. But he argues the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Procunier v. Martinez means the 
letter’s rejection without notice violated his procedural due 
process rights. Vogt Br. 16–18. In essence, to prevail on that 
argument Vogt’s complaint must be read to allege a liberty 
interest in corresponding by mail. 
Wetzel argues that Vogt’s complaint did not assert “any 
liberty interest whatsoever[] for due process purposes.” Wetzel 
Br. 41. So he claims Vogt forfeited that argument. Wetzel Br. 
40. To the contrary, Vogt contends he alleged a due process 
claim based on rejection without notice, and that courts must 
apply the applicable law, even if a pro se litigant failed to 
mention it by name. Reply Br. 8. We agree with Vogt. 
Vogt has consistently maintained that his claim relies on 
Supreme Court precedent articulating his due process right. 
And he pinpointed the legal misstep made by Wetzel and the 
District Court. In his own opposition to the motion to dismiss, 
he stated:  
[N]otice is required by the constitution when a 




See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396[, 417–
19] (1976) . . . . Due Process Protections require 
an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter 
written by or addressed to him. . . . The 
[Secretary] argues that there are valid security 
related reasons for refusing mail with no return 
address. This misses the point. The violation 
complained of is not that it was refused, but that 
it was refused without requ[is]ite notice. 
Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 13, at 6 (cleaned up). In summary, Vogt 
alleged he was deprived of an “individual interest 
encompassed within the 14th Amendment’s protections” and 
that no prison procedures “provide[d] due process of law.” Id.  
Although Vogt did not precisely articulate the 
applicable legal category, he alleged sufficient facts to support 
a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Vogt 
alleged the prison rejected his mail without notice. And he 
demanded damages because that rejection violated his due 
process right under the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 23.  
In short, the failure of Vogt’s pro se complaint to 
mention the word “liberty” did not forfeit his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim. He alleged his right to 
procedural due process was violated when the prison rejected 
his mail without notice. The bottom line is that his allegation 
was enough. 
B 
We now turn to the merits of Vogt’s procedural due 
process claim. States may not deprive “any person” of their 




§ 1. One such liberty, even for prisoners like Vogt, is the 
freedom to correspond by mail. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 418. 
Because that liberty interest was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Procunier, we look there. 
The suit in Procunier challenged California’s prison 
mail censorship policy. Id. at 398. A three-judge district court 
decided the policy violated procedural due process. See id. at 
400. It also held the policy violated free speech. Id. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court affirmed both holdings. Id. at 415, 419. Our 
focus is on the Court’s due process analysis. 
Most relevant here, the Court held the interest “in 
uncensored communication by letter . . . is plainly a liberty 
interest.” Id. at 418 (cleaned up). So prisons must provide 
“minimum procedural safeguards” when they “censor or 
withhold delivery of a particular letter.” Id. at 417. Notice and 
a reasonable chance to challenge the original official’s decision 
satisfy due process. Id. at 418–19. 
Just as the Supreme Court did in Procunier, so too have 
we kept the free speech and due process analyses distinct. In 
Nasir v. Morgan, an inmate challenged a prison censorship 
policy, alleging it violated his and his correspondent’s free 
speech and due process rights. 350 F.3d 366, 368 (3d Cir. 
2003). We held that the prison’s censorship policy did not 
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 369–76. But we did not 
reach the merits of the due process claim because the inmate 
lacked standing to sue on his correspondent’s behalf. See id. at 
376. More to the point, the fact that we analyzed the due 
process claim after we decided the First Amendment issue 




But in Vogt’s case, the District Court collapsed the two 
inquiries. It held Vogt did not have a protected liberty interest 
for due process purposes because the policy did not violate the 
First Amendment. That was error because Vogt has a liberty 
interest in communicating by mail. 
Wetzel resists this conclusion. In essence, he contends 
Procunier applies to censorship cases, while here we consider 
a content-neutral rejection policy. The trouble with this 
argument is Procunier identified a liberty interest in 
corresponding by mail. 416 U.S. at 418. And just as a 
censorship policy constrains correspondence by mail, so too 
does a rejection policy. Indeed, all the circuit courts that have 
addressed the issue to date have interpreted Procunier’s due 
process holding as we do today. See Frost v. Symington, 
197 F.3d 348, 353–54 (9th Cir. 1999) (censoring pornographic 
magazines); Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 
2009) (withholding packages); Perry v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of 
Corr., 664 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting pen pal 
solicitations); Miller v. Downey, 915 F.3d 460, 465–66 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (refusing a legal newspaper as contraband). For 
these reasons, we hold that Vogt alleged the state deprived him 
of a liberty interest under Procunier. Because Procunier 
requires “minimum procedural safeguards,” 416 U.S. at 417, 
the District Court on remand can determine whether they were 
satisfied. 
IV 
We conclude by addressing briefly Vogt’s other 
arguments on appeal. First, we note the parties’ concessions 
have narrowed the case. Because we hold Vogt has a liberty 
interest under Procunier, we need not address whether he has 




concession). Second, since we are remanding Vogt’s due 
process claim, it is appropriate to stay his access to the courts 
claim while his PCRA case is ongoing. Id. at 27:41–28:26 
(Wetzel’s concession). And so all that remains is Vogt’s free 
speech argument. Although the R&R focused on whether the 
policy violated Vogt’s free speech rights, it is unclear whether 
he alleged a free speech claim. In any case, that issue is best 
left for resolution by the District Court on remand. 
* * * 
A host of compelling interests can justify prison mail 
regulations. But prisoners like Vogt have a liberty interest in 
corresponding by mail. So when the prison rejected his letter, 
notification was required. Consistent with these principles, 
Vogt stated a claim that his right to procedural due process was 
violated because he alleged McClearn’s letter was rejected 
without notice. On that basis, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing Vogt’s Fourteenth Amendment 
procedural due process claim. On remand, the District Court 
can adjudicate it at summary judgment or trial, as appropriate. 
And we will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing 
Vogt’s access to the courts claim as unripe with instructions to 
stay that claim while the PCRA litigation proceeds.  
